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Bihar has long been a barometer of north Indian politics. It is also home to one of India’s largest Muslim populations about 16.9% per the 2011 Census (and 17.7% in Bihar’s 2022 caste survey update). Yet over the past decade, the community’s presence in elected offices has thinned, even as its demographic weight holds steady.
From peak to slide: the MLA numbers
In 2015, Bihar elected 24 Muslim MLAs to its 243-member Assembly just under 10% of the House. Most came from the Grand Alliance (RJD–JD(U)–Congress) when the Mahagathbandhan swept the polls.
In 2020, that figure fell to roughly 19, despite concentrated wins in the Seemanchal belt where AIMIM broke through with five seats. Subsequent defections—four of AIMIM’s five MLAs joined the RJD in 2022 further muddied the picture, but the topline remained: the Assembly had fewer Muslim legislators than in 2015.
The pattern is echoed in Parliament: after the 2024 Lok Sabha election, Bihar sent just one Muslim MP Congress’s Mohammad Jawed from Kishanganj. That lone seat underlines the degree to which representation has narrowed at the national level from the state.
Ticket math: shrinking space before the vote
Under-representation often starts before ballots are cast at ticket distribution. In the ongoing run-up to the 2025 Bihar Assembly election, JD(U)’s first list of 57 candidates had zero Muslim nominees, with later reporting indicating only a handful across 100+ names. Such choices structurally cap the ceiling of Muslim representation regardless of voter intent.
Why the decline?
Alliance realignments and fragmentation: The Mahagathbandhan’s ebb-and-flow, JD(U)’s pivots, and the emergence of AIMIM as a challenger in Muslim-heavy seats have fragmented an electorate that historically leaned RJD–Congress. AIMIM’s 2020 surge in Seemanchal and the later defections captured this churn without translating into a durable rise in community seats.
Issue reframing by rivals: NDA parties have prioritized women and youth as cross-cutting appeals, while de-emphasizing explicit community-balancing—reducing the pressure to field Muslim candidates even in competitive constituencies.
Candidate gatekeeping: Parties frequently field Muslim candidates in a narrow band of constituencies, mainly Seemanchal (Kishanganj, Araria, Purnia, Katihar), limiting pathway seats. This geographic “boxing” keeps overall numbers low when a wave does not materialize.
Roll integrity and procedural headwinds:
Controversies around voter deletions especially in Seemanchal have raised concerns about disproportionate impact on Muslims. While litigation continues and facts are disputed, even the allegation shapes mobilization and turnout costs for minority-heavy seats.
Representation is not just symbolic. It affects cabinet berths, committee work, budgetary targeting, and who gets to set the agenda on law-and-order, welfare delivery, and minority welfare schemes. A House with fewer Muslim lawmakers is less likely to surface constituency-specific issues—from language and borderland livelihoods in Seemanchal to madrasa modernization and minority scholarships—at the same intensity or frequency.
The Bihar test in 2025
The choices parties are making now from JD(U)’s early lists with negligible Muslim presence to AIMIM’s new “third front” push will shape whether the slide continues or stabilizes. If mainstream alliances cap Muslim nominations while smaller parties split Muslim-heavy seats, the arithmetic all but ensures low seat conversion, even with high turnout.
Broaden ticketing beyond Seemanchal: Field credible Muslim faces in mixed and urban seats (Patna, Darbhanga, Gaya belts) rather than confining them to a few “designated” constituencies.
Coalitional clarity: Opposition blocs need early, transparent seat-sharing to avoid three-way contests that hand narrow NDA wins in Muslim-influenced seats. (The 2020 map shows how close-run many contests were.)
Protect the rolls: Full transparency and remediation on additions/deletions—down to booth-level disclosure can restore trust where deletion spikes have been alleged.
Programmatic, not identity-only, outreach: Strong delivery on jobs, education, public health, and flood-control in Kosi–Seemanchal, with measurable targets, will convert turnout into durable representation rather than episodic swings.
Cultivate women and youth leadership: Meet the “Mahila–Yuva” pivot with Muslim women and youth candidates who speak to universal issues safety, skilling, MSMEs beyond communal frames.
Bihar’s numbers tell a clear story: from 24 Muslim MLAs in 2015 to 19 in 2020, and just one Muslim MP in 2024, representation has narrowed even as population share stays steady. Whether 2025 breaks the slide will depend less on rhetoric and more on who gets tickets, how alliances avoid splits, and whether every eligible voter remains on the rolls especially in districts where a few thousand votes swing a seat.
The feature image is AI-generated.