A sharp investigative look at why India is unlikely to return former Bangladeshi leader Sheikh Hasina to face a death sentence in Dhaka, exploring political tensions, shifting alliances, and the long historical ties shaping this high-stakes standoff.
The dramatic fall of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 reshaped South Asian politics in ways few expected. Her hurried escape to India as protesters overran her Dhaka residence brought a long and controversial chapter of Bangladesh’s politics to a sudden end. Now, with her conviction for crimes against humanity and a death sentence handed down by Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal, the demand for her return has grown louder. Yet New Delhi shows no sign of sending her back. The situation raises a simple but critical question: Why is India holding firm, despite diplomatic pressure and the risk of long-term tension with a neighbour it once counted as a close ally?
This investigation explores the layers behind India’s reluctance, revealing how politics, history and shifting regional power balances have created a complex maze with no easy exit.
A death sentence in Dhaka and a diplomatic deadlock
Bangladesh’s request for Hasina’s extradition rests on a treaty with India that, in theory, obliges both nations to return wanted individuals. Dhaka’s current administration, led by an interim government under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, insists that allowing the former prime minister to stay in India undermines justice. Officials have even called India’s refusal a “highly unfriendly act”.
Yet the legal picture is far from simple. India points to a key exception in the treaty: the clause that bars extradition when the offence is seen as political in nature. New Delhi believes the charges and sentence against Hasina fall squarely into that category. Analysts across India argue that the dramatic shift in Bangladesh’s politics after Hasina’s fall has created an environment where the ruling forces are openly critical of India, making the trial appear heavily influenced by political motives.
Beyond the legal debate is the undeniable fact that Hasina was India’s closest partner in Dhaka for more than a decade. Her fall was a major shock to New Delhi’s long-term strategy in the region. For years, India counted on Hasina’s Awami League government for cooperation on border security, trade, counterterrorism, and regional stability. The student-led uprising that drove her out and the thousands of deaths during the 2024 crackdown have left deep scars in Bangladesh’s internal politics. But for India, the key concern is the new political group in Dhaka, which it fears is less friendly and more aligned with Pakistan.
Sending Hasina back would signal India’s acceptance of a government that openly blames New Delhi for supporting her rule. That alone makes extradition unlikely.
A historic bond that India cannot easily abandon
To understand why India continues to shelter Hasina, it is necessary to look back at the shared history between New Delhi and the Sheikh family. India played a decisive role in the 1971 liberation war that created Bangladesh. Hasina’s father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, became the founding leader of the new nation with strong support from India.
After the 1975 assassination of most of her family, Hasina spent years living in New Delhi under the protection of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Her return to Bangladeshi politics in the 1980s, her rise to power in 1996, and her long rule after 2009 all carried echoes of this long and personal relationship. Even her escape in 2024 followed the same pattern—India opened its doors when she needed refuge most.
For New Delhi, turning its back on her now would contradict decades of political loyalty. Indian officials and diplomats have framed the current moment as a question of moral responsibility. They argue that returning Hasina, especially after a death sentence, would be impossible for India to justify, both on ethical grounds and because she was a long-time partner who helped stabilise India’s eastern border.
But the deeper reason lies in political memory. Dynastic parties in South Asia rarely disappear fully, even after major losses. India knows that the Awami League may one day re-enter Bangladesh’s political mainstream. Keeping Hasina safe could secure influence if that moment ever arrives.
A fragile regional chessboard with shifting alliances
India’s hesitation is also linked to broader regional worries. Over the past year, the interim government in Bangladesh has taken steps that suggest a major shift in foreign policy. Dhaka has moved closer to Pakistan while openly criticising India. At the same time, China’s economic influence in Bangladesh continues to grow.
For New Delhi, these moves raise old concerns of strategic encirclement. Losing Bangladesh as a friendly neighbour would reshape the balance of power in South Asia. India’s decision-makers fear that extraditing Hasina would harden the anti-India position of the current Bangladeshi leadership and push the country even further toward rival powers.
Trade relations between the two nations remain steady, but political trust has sunk to one of the lowest points in decades. Indian analysts argue that New Delhi will wait for Bangladesh’s elections in early 2025 before making any bold diplomatic decisions. Only after a new elected government takes office—whatever its political leanings—can India begin rebuilding ties.
Until then, keeping Hasina in India may serve as a bargaining tool, a signal that New Delhi still holds leverage in a relationship gone cold.
What the standoff means for the future of India-Bangladesh ties
The question of Hasina’s extradition is more than a legal dispute. It has become a symbol of the fragile state of India-Bangladesh relations. If unresolved, it risks shaping the region’s politics for years.
For Bangladesh, the refusal fuels anger at what many now see as an overbearing neighbour. For India, the situation tests its ability to balance moral duty, strategic interest and regional stability. Both countries share deep cultural and economic ties, and neither can afford long-term hostility. Yet trust cannot be repaired while the Hasina issue remains at the centre of bilateral tensions.
The coming months will reveal whether the two nations can move beyond this standoff. India must adjust to a new political atmosphere in Dhaka, while Bangladesh must decide whether pursuing Hasina at all costs is worth risking regional cooperation.
In the end, the story of Sheikh Hasina’s exile reflects a larger truth about South Asian politics: history, alliances and personal ties often weigh as heavily as laws or diplomacy. How India and Bangladesh navigate this moment will show whether old bonds can survive new political storms.
By: Arjuman Arju
Source: Diplotic