Strategic compromise: Is this the new language of the world political order?

An interesting point is that even La Pen or Italy’s Georgio Maloni does not own the extreme-Right ideological approach. In a recent interview to an American channel, La Pen shocked the audience by stating that her party does not belong to the extreme Right-wing faction 

By Rupak Bardhan Roy

In the medical science industry, we frequently use the phrase “strategic compromise for the greater good”. To clarify this with an example, imagine that a business outfit, Company A, owns the formula for a specific drug. This formula places it significantly ahead in the market for treating a particular disease. Now, suppose a pandemic, similar to COVID-19, breaks out. Company B, a competitor, is close to developing a vaccine for this deadly virus, but cannot bring it to the market because it incorporates parts of Company A’s formula. Unauthorized use of this formula could lead to lawsuits amounting to billions due to intellectual property infringement. 

In such special circumstances, Companies A and B might engage in “mutual licensing”, whereby they agree to share their formulas for a fee over a decade or so. It is said that the executives of these companies, prioritizing human life over competition, made this strategic compromise for the greater good. I have personally witnessed such a situation in my limited corporate research career.

Now, why am I making such a fuss over the concept of “strategic compromise”? There are three reasons:

  1. The recent French legislative (not presidential) elections and its surprising results.
  2. The resurgence of the Far-Right movements in Europe, nearly eighty years after World War II, including in France, Italy and Germany.
  3. The strange similarities between our domestic, melodramatic, Lok Sabha elections, and the 2024 French election results.

Given these points, it is important to have a discussion on the societal and psychological basis of “strategic compromise” in the context of these elections. 

Last June, the progress of Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella’s Far-Right party, National Rally, in the French counterpart of the European Parliament, caused concern among many democratic-minded citizens. And the Far-Right’s advance in France seemed to echo the rise of Right-wing parties in Italy, Germany’s AfD, and the Neo-Nazi groups. 

French President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist coalition has been losing credibility due to policies perceived as neglectful of the working and middle classes. The final nail in the coffin was a new law raising the retirement age to 64. 

The Far-Left also faced issues, as did the extreme Left, Greens, Socialists and Communists. They could not consolidate their votes effectively. Consequently, the Far-Right appeared to be the only viable alternative for many voters dissatisfied with Macron.

To counter this, he called for a snap election. It is important to note that National Rally’s predecessor, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front, had connections with fascist and anti-Semitic figures from earlier Nazi regimes. Hence, the current National Rally’s roots are clear to everyone. 

France’s electoral cycle is divided into two rounds. If no party achieves a full majority in the first round, the parties with at least 12.5 per cent of the vote in their respective seats can contest in a second round. If no party achieves full majority even after this final round, a coalition remains the only viable option. It’s worthy to note that no party in France prefers this coalition approach, as it is unnatural to them and their political history. 

Remarkably, shortly after the snap election was announced, an unusual event occurred. Despite their ideological differences, Far-Left leader, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s party, formed a new coalition with the other three Left-leaning counterparts — the New Popular Front (NFP), to contest the elections. Their main campaign promises included:

  1. Increasing public spending and wages.
  2. Gender equality and measures against physical violence on women.
  3. Scientific progress to address climate issues.
  4. Efforts to combat social issues like Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and racial discrimination.
  5. Support for a Palestinian statehood, and more. 

Clearly, NFP’s positions were progressive and humanitarian, in stark contrast to the Far-Right. Nevertheless, the New Popular Front secured the second place in the first round. 

Interestingly, voter turn-out increased by about 20 per cent compared to 2022, resulting in three parties securing over 12.5 per cent of the vote in 306 constituencies. Out of these, except for 30 seats, all were contested among the three main fronts. 

Thus, the second round saw a possible division of votes among these parties, providing an opportunity for the Far-Right to gain power. National Rally’s seeming position for success, legitimized La pen’s prodigy, Bardella, who almost declared himself as a potential prime minister. 

However, in an unexpected twist, the traditional rival factions, the Left and Macron’s Ensemble Party, reached an agreement to withdraw candidates from certain seats where each were trailing, to avoid splitting of the anti-Far-Right vote. This strategic alliance led to an interesting outcome, with the Far-Right failing to secure power, and the united Left-Wing bloc winning the largest number of seats.

 Although no party has achieved a full majority, keeping the Far-Right away from power was seen as a ‘greater good’. This was evidenced by the people’s joy and relief expressed on the streets of Paris and other places. 

Macron and Mélenchon referred to this strategic alliance as the ‘Republican Front’, which also aligned with historical French political strategies, reminding us of the ‘India Alliance’ in the recently held parliamentary elections. The mainstream media in France, like in India, has been accused of favouring certain political factions, while independent media platforms have gained significant credit for opposing the Far-Right. 

This novel election scenario raises several questions. While the immediate threat was averted, will Mélenchon’s New Popular Front be able to maintain this strategic Left-Wing unity for the 2027 presidential elections, especially, given their internal disagreements? Secondly, can the progressive and secular parties in India sustain a similar grand unification strategy to combat communal and Right-wing politics? Ultimately, strategic compromise is becoming the new language of politics in the 21st century. 

An interesting point to consider here is that even La Pen or Italy’s Georgio Maloni does not own the extreme-Right ideological approach publicly, enabling certain Left-leaning livelihood policies to keep the swing vote bank secure. In a recent interview to an American channel, La Pen shocked the interviewee and the audience by stating that she does not consider that her party belongs to the extreme Right-wing faction. 

By saying so she also wanted to distance herself from the German Neo-Nazi and Islamophobic faction. So, finally, are we witnessing the death of all ideologies, and is strategic compromise becoming the new language of the world political order? 

Scholars like Amy Gutmann from Penn State University and Dennis Thompson from Harvard point in this direction. They are emphasizing that the success of democratic politics depends significantly on attitudes towards compromise, and recognizing the range of opinions and policies to reduce polarization. 

Indeed, as we seek these answers, we have an open field for debate and discussion, as questioning entrenched ideological fundamentals is essential for preserving a culture of inquiry.

The writer is Senior Scientist, GE Healthcare, Nice, Southern France.

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